Section 1: Moot Court by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
2009
Section 1: Moot Court
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 2009 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 1: Moot Court" (2009). Supreme Court Preview. 206.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/206
I. MOOT COURT
In This Section:
New Cases: 08-7412 Graham v. Florida; 08-7621 Sullivan v'. Florida
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 2
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 12
"High Court to Look at Life Sentences for Juveniles" p. 14
Robert Barnes
"Why Two Juvenile Sentence Cases?" p. 16
Lyle Denniston
"Sentenced as Teen, Convicted Rapist Appeals to Highest Court" p. 18
Bill Mears
"Judge Gives Teen-Ager Life Term in Rape Case" p. 21
The Associated Press
"Police Arrest 3 Robbery Suspects" p. 22
Tia Mitchell
"Defining 'Cruel and Unusual' When Offender Is 13" p. 23
Adam Liptak
"States Reconsider Life Behind Bars for Youth" p. 26
Amanda Paulson
"Supreme Court Bans Execution of Juveniles" p. 28
David G. Savage
"U.S. Supreme Court vs. the World" p. 31
Tony Mauro
"The Young and the Reckless: The Supreme Court Contemplates
Executing Juveniles"
Dahlia Lithwick p. 33
1
Graham v. Florida
08-7412
Sullivan v. Florida
08-7621
Rulings Below: Graham v. Florida, 982 So.2d 43 (Fla. App. I Dist. 2008); Sullivan v. Florida,
987 So.2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist., 2008)
Petitioners Graham and Sullivan both were convicted of crimes when they were juveniles and, as
a result, were sentenced to life without possibility of parole. Graham was convicted of an armed
robbery committed when he was 17 years old. Graham had been convicted of several other
offenses prior to the armed robbery conviction. As a result, Graham was on probation and his
violation of his probation triggered the life prison sentence. Sullivan committed the rape of a 72-
year-old woman when he was 13 years old and was convicted and sentenced to life when he was
14 years old. Sullivan also had previous convictions that triggered harsher sentencing for his rape
conviction.
Question Presented: Does sentencing minors to life in prison without the possibility of parole
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the rationale of the Supreme Court's holding in
Roper v. Simmons?
Terrance Jamar GRAHAM, Appellant,
V.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Decided April 10, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
Wolf, J.
Appellant raises a number of issues on
appeal. We affirm as to all of the issues;
however, we write to address appellant's
assertion that his sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of
parole for a crime committed as a juvenile
violates the federal and Florida prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment.
At the age of sixteen, appellant was charged
with (1) armed burglary with assault or
battery (a first-degree life felony) and (2)
attempted armed robbery (a second-degree
felony) for an incident involving the robbery
of a local restaurant in which his
codefendant assaulted the restaurant owner
with a pipe. Appellant pled guilty to the
offenses in return for the court withholding
adjudication and three years' probation with
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the condition that he serve twelve months in
a pre-trial detention facility.
Appellant served his twelve-month sentence
and was released from jail on June 25. 2004.
In December 2004, an affidavit of violation
of probation was filed alleging appellant
committed new law offenses to include
armed home invasion robbery. At the
violation of probation hearing, the State
presented evidence establishing that
appellant and two codefendants entered the
victim's apartment forcefully and that, while
appellant held the victim at gunpoint, his
codefendants robbed the home. After
completing the robbery. appellant and his
codefendants locked the victim in a closet.
Shortly after leaving the scene of the
incident, appellant was involved in a lengthy
car chase with the police through a
residential neighborhood. After his arrest,
appellant was asked about similar robberies
in the same vicinity, and officers assert
appellant conceded he was involved in "two
or three before tonight."
Following the probation hearing, the trial
court found appellant guilty of the alleged
violations and sentenced him to life
imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. Appellant was nineteen years old at
the time of his sentencing. The trial court
announced its reasoning behind the sentence
and stated in pertinent part:
Mr. Graham, as I look back on your
case, yours is really candidly a sad
situation. You had, as far as I can tell,
you have quite a family structure.
You had a lot of people who wanted
to try and help you get your life
turned around including the court
system, and you had a judge who
took the step to try and give you
direction through his probation order
to give you a chance to get back onto
track. And at the time you seemed
through your letters that that is
exactly what you wanted to do. And
I don't know wxhy it is that you threw
your life away. I don't know why.
But you did, and that is what is so
sad about this today is that you have
actually been given a chance to get
through this, the original charge,
which were very serious charges to
begin with. The attempted robbery
with a weapon was a very serious
charge.
[I]n a very short period of time
you were back before the Court on a
violation of this probation, and then
here you are two years later standing
before me, literally the-facing a life
sentence as to-up to life as to count
1 and up to 15 years as to count 2.
And I don't understand why you
would be given such a great
opportunity to do something with
your life and why you would throw it
away. The only thing that I can
rationalize is that you decided that
this is how you were going to lead
your life and there is nothing that we
can do for you. And as the state
pointed out, that this is an escalating
pattern of criminal conduct on your
part and that we can't help you any
further.
We can't do anything to deter you.
This is the way you are going to lead
your life, and I don't know why you
are going to. You've made that
decision. I have no idea. But.
evidently, that is what you decided to
do.
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So then it becomes a focus, if I can't
do anything to help you, if I can't do
anything to get you back on the right
path, then I have to start focusing on
the community and trying to protect
the community from your actions.
And unfortunately, that is where we
are today is I don't see where I can
do anything to help you any further.
You've evidently decided this is the
direction you're going to take in life,
and it's unfortunate that you made
that choice.
I have reviewed the statute. I don't
see where any further juvenile
sanctions would be appropriate. I
don't see where any youthful
offender sanctions would be
appropriate. Given your escalating
pattern of criminal conduct, it is
apparent to the Court that you have
decided that this is the way you are
going to live your life and that the
only thing I can do now is to try to
protect the community from your
actions.
On November 5, 2002, the Florida voters
amended article 1, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution mandating that Florida's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment be construed
in conformity with the United State Supreme
Court's construction of the Eighth
Amendment. In his initial brief, appellant
asserts both a facial and an as applied
constitutional challenge to his mandatory
life sentence.
I. Facial Challenge
Appellant's facial challenge to the statute
authorizing life imprisonment of juveniles is
based on two main components. First,
appellant asserts the use of true life
sentences on juveniles should be per se
banned pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Roper v.
Simmons, as well as other state court
precedent striking similar sentences. Second,
appellant asserts the use of the sentence
violates international norms, as well as the
United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty
to which the United States has become a
party.
A. Per se invalid based on Roper
and other state precedent
Appellant relies heavily on dicta found in
the United States Supreme Court's opinion
Roper, to support his instant argument. In
Roper, the Supreme Court found the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles
to be per se unconstitutional for several
reasons. First, the court determined that the
use of the death penalty on juvenile
offenders had become truly unusual as
contemplated by the Eighth Amendment
because of (1) the current trend by state
legislatures to ban the use of the death
penalty on juveniles and (2) the lack of the
death penalty's use on juveniles in those
states that did legalize the sentence. Second,
the Supreme Court noted that the death
penalty could be used only for those
committing a "'narrow category of the most
serious crimes' and whose extreme
culpability makes them 'the most deserving
of execution."' Based on the foregoing, the
Supreme Court necessarily excluded
juveniles from this category because
juveniles, in the struggle to find themselves
and determine their character, are more
susceptible to morally reprehensible
behavior, but are less likely to have
"irretrievably depraved character." Third,
the Supreme Court found that, while the
overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty is
not controlling, it provided significant
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confirmation that the imposition of the death
penalty on juveniles was a grossly
disproportionate sentence for offenders
under the age of eighteen.
Appellant ignores the largest and most
evident distinguishing factor of the Roper
opinion. As the State points out, "death is
different."
Relying on the sound reasoning outlined in
the foregoing precedent, xe reject
appellant's invitation to extend the holding
of Roper to prohibit the sentencing of
juveniles to life imprisonment in all
situations.
The United States Supreme Court and the
Florida Supreme Court have expressly stated
that a challenge to the length of years
sentenced must rest on a determination of
whether the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the crime. In Adaway v.
State, the Florida Supreme Court held that
"4to violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, a prison sentence must,
at least, be grossly disproportionate to the
crime." Specifically, in Adaway, the Florida
Supreme Court considered and rejected a
challenge to appellant's life sentence
without the possibility of parole for sexual
battery on a child under the age of twelve. In
considering appellant's Eighth Amendment
argument, the supreme court noted:
The United States Supreme Court
has not reached a majority consensus
on the standard for determining the
constitutionality of long prison
sentences. The Court has
acknowledged that "in determining
whether a particular sentence for a
term of years can violate the Eighth
Amendment, we have not established
a clear or consistent path for courts
to follow." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63 (2003). A majority of the
Court recently agreed, however,
that "[tjhrough this thicket of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
one governing legal principle
emerges as 'clearly established"'-
namely, that a "gross
disproportionality principle is
applicable to sentences for terms
of years." (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1)).
Adaway, 902 So. 2d at 748-49 (emphasis
added). Further, in Solem v. Helm, the
United States Supreme Court announced
objective criteria to be used in a "grossly
disproportionate" consideration and looked
specifically at: (1) the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions.
Because the weight of applicable precedent
requires a fact-specific inquiry into the
"grossly disproportionate" analysis, this type
of constitutional argument does not lend
itself to a facial challenge. To state that the
imposition of a life sentence without parole
on a juvenile is per se violative of the
Eighth Amendment, a court would have to
reject existing Supreme Court precedent
regarding the factual inquiry required in
such a case. As such, it does not appear that
the United States Supreme Court
contemplated this type of per se prohibition
to a specific term of years.
In addition to the above assertion, appellant
further argues that non-binding state court
precedent establishes that the use of life
sentences without parole in juvenile cases
has become unusual as defined by the
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Eighth Amendment and, thus, should be per
se barred. Based on a review of these cases,
we do not agree.
First, each of the state court cases cited by
appellant involves an as applied
consideration of appellant's sentencing
claim. There is no per se rule in any state
rejecting the use of life sentences for
juveniles in every case; each of the cases
cited by appellant involves a fact-specific
inquiry into the disproportionate nature of
the sentence imposed to the nature of the
offense and/or the appellant's age.
Additionally, several courts have upheld the
imposition of a life sentence for a juvenile
utilizing a similar disproportionality analysis.
In Tate v. State, the Fourth District
considered a juvenile's challenge to the
imposition of a true life sentence for his
brutal murder of a six-year-old child and
stated in pertinent part:
And, finally, we reject the argument
that a life sentence without the
possibility of parole is cruel or
unusual punishment on a twelve-
year-old child and that it violates
Article I, Section 17 of the Florida
Constitution and the Eighth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Tate argues that his
sentence is greatly disproportionate
to the sentences of other juveniles
charged with similar acts.
In Blackshear v. State, this court
rejected a cruel or unusual
punishment challenge to three
consecutive life sentences imposed
for three robberies committed when
Blackshear was thirteen. Upon his
guilty plea, Blackshear was certified
as an adult and placed on probation.
When he violated his probation at
age twenty, he was sentenced to
three consecutive life sentences.
There, we recognized that
"[s]entences imposed on juveniles
[as adults] of life imprisonment are
not uncommon in Florida Courts."
In Phillips v. State, the defendant
was fourteen years old at the time he
murdered an eight year old child. He
was convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. ...
In concluding that there was no
violation of proportionality, the
Phillips court noted:
The responsibility for making
this choice rests with the
legislature and is entitled to
substantial deference. Further,
we recognize that not every
citizen nor even every
member of this court will
agree with the penalty
established by the legislature
for this crime as applied to
this offender, but the
legislative determination falls
within the bounds of a
rational conclusion regarding
an appropriate prison term for
the crime of first-degree
murder. Finally, we find that
the penalty of life
imprisonment is not grossly
disproportionate to the crime
of first-degree murder. If, as
Justice Kennedy's opinion
noted, "the crime of felony
murder without specific
intent to kill . . . [is] a crime
for which no sentence of
imprisonment would be
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disproportionate," [ Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991) ] then the sentence of
life imprisonment for the
specific intent crime of first-
degree murder cannot be
disproportionate.
Accordingly, we hold that Mr.
Phillips' sentence does not
violate the proportionality
principle mandated by the
Eighth Amendment.
These cases make clear that the imposition
of a true life sentence on a juvenile has
never, in state or federal courts, been
considered per se unlawful. Accordingly,
appellant cannot assert that established
precedent supports a conclusion that the use
of the sentence has become so unique as to
be unusual as defined by the Eighth
Amendment.
B. Per se invalid as contrary to
international norms
As his last facial challenge, appellant asserts
the use of the sentence violates international
norms as well as the ICCPR treaty. In his
brief, appellant states that "only fourteen
nations, in theory, allow for juveniles to be
sentenced to life, and only three of those
nations appear to do so in practice."
Appellant further notes that, outside the
United States, the number of persons serving
life sentences for juvenile crimes is
approximately a dozen and that the United
Kingdom has recently per se barred the
imposition of such a sentence in Singh v.
United Kingdom. Appellant points out that
the United States currently has 2,225
persons sentenced to life for juvenile crimes;
Florida houses 273 such persons. This court
acknowledges that, above all others, this
argument is the strongest in support of a per
se ban on the use of a true life sentence for
juveniles. Specifically, in Roper, the United
States Supreme Court discussed the weight
to be given international pressure to change
our existing legal system and noted:
Our determination that the death
penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18
finds confirmation in the stark reality
that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to
give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty. This reality does not
become controlling, for the task of
interpreting the Eighth
Amendment remains our
responsibility. Yet at least from the
time of the Court's decision in Trop,
the Court has referred to the laws of
other countries and to international
authorities as instructive for its
interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments." 356 U.S.
86 at 102-103 (plurality opinion)
("The civilized nations of the world
are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as
punishment for crime").
Over time, from one generation to
the next, the Constitution has come
to earn the high respect and even, as
Madison dared to hope, the
veneration of the American people.
The document sets forth, and rests
upon, innovative principles original
to the American experience, such as
federalism; a proven balance in
political mechanisms through
separation of powers; specific
guarantees for the accused in
criminal cases: and broad provisions
to secure individual freedom and
7
preserve human dignity. These
doctrines and guarantees are central
to the American experience and
remain essential to our present-day
self-definition and national identity.
Not the least of the reasons we honor
the Constitution, then, is because we
know it to be our own. It does not
lessen our fidelity to the Constitution
or our pride in its origins to
acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental
rights by other nations and peoples
simply underscores the centrality of
those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom.
Similar to the imposition of the death
penalty on juvenile offenders, the sentencing
of a juvenile to a true life sentence is
frowned upon by the international
community. However, in Roper, the United
States Supreme Court further noted that it is
for the courts of the United States, not the
international or community courts, to
interpret the Eighth Amendment's
protections. As such, international pressure
must be balanced with the due deference
owed the state legislatures of this country in
matters of sentencing. Specifically, any
analysis applying the Eighth Amendment
must provide due deference to "the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily
possess in determining the types and limits
of punishments for crimes, as well as to the
discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals." Solem, 463
U.S. at 290. While the weight given the
international community is persuasive, it
cannot be said to counter the individual
rights of the state to impose its chosen
sentencing scheme if that scheme is not held
to be otherwise unconstitutional.
II. As Applied Challenge
A. As applied to appellant, the life
sentence is grossly disproportionate to his
offense
Appellant asserts his particular sentence is
"grossly disproportionate" to his offense and,
thus, violates the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. Based on
the Solem disproportionality analysis, we do
not agree.
In Blackshear, the Fourth District
considered a nearly identical challenge to
the Eighth Amendment by an appellant who
had been a juvenile upon the commission of
his underlying offense, who subsequently
violated his probation through the
commission of several robberies, and was
resentenced for the original offense at the
age of twenty. In Blackshear, the Fourth
District affirmed the imposition of a life
sentence and noted in pertinent part:
Appellant also complains that his life
sentences, imposed for crimes he
committed at age thirteen, amount to
cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 17, of the Florida
Constitution. However, when
appellant committed his crimes
and was certified as an adult, he
was placed on probation, not
sentenced to life imprisonment as
he could have been under the
sentencing guidelines. The life
sentences were imposed only after
the violation of probation, when
appellant was twenty years old.
Thus, appellant was sentenced at age
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twenty for crimes that the legislature
has authorized a sentence of life
imprisonment.
Even considering age, appellant's
sentence is not grossly
disproportionate. Appellant was
originally charged and sentenced
as an adult and did not object. The
crimes to which he pled were
serious, violent crimes. By his plea
and sentence to probation, he was
given an opportunity to avoid
incarceration by successfully
completing his probation, which he
did not. Instead he was arrested
for possession of a firearm in
violation of his probation. Finally,
the life sentence was imposed for a
violation of probation at age
twenty. Not only was the sentence
imposed for three different armed
burglaries, but appellant also had
a long history of other convictions,
including five for strong armed
robbery, many convictions for
burglary, grand theft, and
additional misdemeanors.
Sentences imposed on juveniles of
life imprisonment are not uncommon
in Florida Courts.
The reasoning in Blackshear is sound and
highly relevant to the current appeal. In his
"disproportionate" argument, appellant
emphasizes that he was sixteen at the time of
the commission of his original offense and
that the offense involved a restaurant
burglary in which he personally injured no
one. However, this argument glosses over
the record facts which establish that, after
being placed on probation-an extremely
lenient sentence for the commission of a life
felony-appellant committed at least two
armed robberies and confessed to the
commission of an additional three. These
offenses were not committed by a pre-teen,
but a seventeen-year-old who was ultimately
sentenced at the age of nineteen.
Additionally, these robberies involved the
use of a weapon, and appellant himself held
a gun to a man's head during the incident for
which he was violated.
While the United States Supreme Court has
noted that juveniles in general are more
amenable to successful rehabilitation, the
particular facts of this case cut against
rehabilitation for appellant. As the trial court
noted in its sentencing colloquy, appellant
was given an unheard of probationary
sentence for a life felony, he wvrote a letter
expressing his remorse and promising to
refrain from the commission of further crime,
and he had a strong family structure to
support him. However, appellant rejected his
second chance and chose to continue
committing crimes at an escalating pace.
It is the tested theory of rehabilitation on
appellant that sets this case apart from other
challenges to a juvenile's life sentence.
There is record evidence to support
appellant's inability to rehabilitate-
evidence that is usually not available upon
an original sentencing proceeding. The trial
court balanced the possibility of appellant's
rehabilitation with the safety of society in
determining his sentence and was well
within its discretion to do so. Accordingly,
while appellant is correct that a true life
sentence is typically reserved for juveniles
guilty of more heinous crimes such as
homicide, none of the cases cited by
appellant involved a tested theory of
rehabilitation. Based on Blackshear, the
gravity of appellant's crimes, as well as the
treatment of like juveniles, supports the
imposition of appellant's true life sentence
premised on a Solem factor analysis. As
such, similar to the defendant in Blackshear
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and based on the particular facts of this case,
appellant's sentence does not violate either
the Florida or the United States
Constitutions' ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.
B. International treaty violation
Appellant further asserts the imposition of
such a sentence violates the ICCPR, an
international treaty ratified by the United
States in 1966. Even if appellant has
standing to personally invoke the provisions
of the ICCPR, a plain reading of the ICCPR
does not support appellant's contention.
While the ICCPR's juvenile provisions (1)
emphasize the rehabilitation and education
of juveniles; (2) require the separation of
child offenders from adults; and (3) require
that the provisions of treatment be
appropriate to the child's age, upon ratifying
the ICCPR, the U.S. Senate attached the
following limiting reservation:
(5) That the policy and practice of
the United States are generally in
compliance with and supportive of
the [ICCPR's] provisions regarding
treatment of juveniles in the criminal
justice system. Nevertheless, the
United States reserves the right, in
exceptional circumstances, to treat
juveniles as adults, notwithstanding
paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Article 10
and paragraph 4 of Article 14 ....
Appellant asserts that the term "exceptional
circumstances" in the above reservation
indicates that the United States' ratification
of the ICCPR prohibits appellant's sentence
in this case.
In Kane v. WJ'inn, 319 F.Supp.2d 162, 196 (D.
Mass. 2004), the Massachusetts district
court considered the ICCPR as well as other
treaties when discussing the rights of
prisoners to be heard following disciplinary
actions; the court stated in pertinent part:
Treaties are as legally binding as
federal statutes, and if a treaty and a
federal statute conflict, the later in
time is controlling. At the same time
a treaty can only be directly applied
in a case if it is self-executing-that
is, if the provisions "act directly" on
the issues in question, rather than
merely "pledge the faith of the
United States to pass acts which shall
ratify and confirm them." Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829). If the treaty is non-self-
executing, it "addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature
must execute the contract before it
can become a rule for the Court."
Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254.
Even when a treaty is not self-
executing, courts must strive not to
interpret statutes to conflict with
the international obligations
expressed in such a treaty.
The ICCPR was ratified subject to a
declaration of non-execution. As such,
appellant has no judicially enforceable right
directly arising out of a challenge to the
ICCPR as it would be interpreted by its
signatory nations; his argument can attack
only the breadth of United States law
implementing the treaty. This case does not
involve such an attack. Until the treaty is
implemented though congressional action, it
cannot act as a limitation on the power of
the Florida Legislature to determine the
appropriate penalties for violations of the
law.
For the foregoing reasons, this court
declines to implement a per se ban on the
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sentencing of juveniles to life imprisonment.
Additionally, based on the underlying facts
of this case. this court does not find
appellant's sentence was grossly
disproportionate to his crime. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM appellant's sentences.
THOMAS, J., and PLEUS, JR., ROBERT J.,
ASSOCIATE JUDGE, CONCUR.
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Joe Harris SULLIVAN, Petitioner/Defendant,
V.
STATE of Florida, Respondent/Plaintiff.
Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in and for Escambia County. State of Florida
Decided October 31, 2007
[Excerpt: some citations and footnotes omitted]
This cause is before the Court on
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction
Relief, filed July 24, 2007. After due
consideration of the instant motion, record,
and relevant legal authority the Court finds
that Defendant is not entitled to relief.
On November 16, 1989, a jury found
Defendant guilty of two counts of Sexual
Battery, two counts of Burglary of Dwelling,
and one count of Petit Theft. The Court
sentenced Defendant to 15 years, each count
concurrent on the counts of burglary with
credit for 204 days. For the counts of Sexual
Battery, Defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment on each count, concurrent,
with credit for 204 days. On the Petit Theft,
Defendant was sentenced to time served.
The rules of criminal procedure require a
defendant to file a motion for postconviction
relief within two years after the judgment
and sentence under attack become final. See
Rule 3.850(b). A sentence becomes final for
the purposes of Rule 3.850 when direct
review proceedings are concluded and
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for
postconviction relief returns to the trial court.
Rule 3.850 recognizes only three exceptions
to the two-year time limitation. They are as
follows: 1) the facts on which the claim is
based were not known to Defendant or his
counsel and could not have been ascertained
through due diligence, 2) the fundamental
constitutional right asserted was not
established within the period provided for
and has been held to apply retroactively, and
3) Defendant retained counsel to file a 3.850
motion and counsel, through neglect, failed
to do so.
The rules of criminal procedure further state
that "A second or successive motion may be
dismissed if the judge finds that . . . the
failure of the movant or the attorney to
assert those grounds in a prior motion
constituted an abuse of the procedure
governed by these rules." Fla. R. Crim. Pro.
3.850(f). Postconviction 3.850 motions may
be "barred as successive where the
'defendant's current Rule 3.850 motion is
one that could have or should have been
raised in his first Rule 3.850 motion.'
Franklin v. State, 923 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 3rd
DCA 2006) quoting Scrambling v. State,
919 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
In the instant case, Defendant was sentenced
on December 12. 1989. The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed Defendant's
judgment and sentence on June 10, 1991,
giving Defendant until approximately June
of 1993 to file a motion for postconviction
relief pursuant to Rule 3.850. Such a motion
was filed in October of 1992. It was
dismissed, and Defendant was allowed to
refile. He did so in March of 1993. That
motion was denied in January of 1996.
Consequently, at this time, the Court may
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address Defendant's claims only if they fall
into the enumerated exceptions to the two-
year time limitation and could not have been
raised in Defendant's original 3.850 motion.
Defendant's claim under Roper could not
have been raised in his original 3.850
motion because his motion was filed many
years before the United States Supreme
Court ruled on Roper, thereby escaping
dismissal based on successiveness. However,
the Court finds the claim raised in the instant
motion, based on Roper, does not fit into the
limited category of claims allowed to be
brought after the expiration of the two-year
filing period.
In the instant motion, Defendant argues that
the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Roper should disallow the sentencing of
juvenile offenders to life in prison without
parole. Defendant committed his crime
when he was thirteen years of age, and the
Court sentenced him to "die in prison."
Defendant argues that in light of Roper, his
sentence should be mitigated.
Because new law cannot qualify as newly
discovered evidence, and Defendant has
given the Court no reason to believe that his
counsel neglected to file a 3.850 motion, the
only exception under which Defendant's
claim could fall is the second: the law has
established a new, fundamental, retroactive
constitutional right. Defendant argues in his
motion that "after the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Roper it is
unconstitutional to sentence a thirteen-year-
old child to die in prison." However, Roper
has established no such constitutional right.
Rather. Roper established only one new
constitutional right, the right for a juvenile
not to be given the death penalty. Because
Roper did not establish the constitutional
right Defendant alleges, Defendant does not
have a valid constitutional claim. Hence,
Defendant's claim does not fit into any
exception to the time limits in Rule 3.850
and must be dismissed as procedurally
barred.
Even if Defendant's motion were properly
before the Court, Defendant's argument is
meritless. Although Defendant's motion
includes many references to sociological
sources, counsel has not provided the Court
any legal authority for Defendant's proposed
reading of Roper. Furthermore, the Court
can find no controlling legal authority
supporting Defendant's argument. Rather,
this Court has found that the Supreme Court
of Florida has repeatedly declined to extend
the implications of Roper beyond its clear,
bright-line rule. Additionally, the Supreme
Court of Florida has made clear that a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole
is a perfectly acceptable penalty under
Roper. Consequently, the Court can find no
grounds for mitigating Defendant's sentence.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and
ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant's pro se
Postconviction Relief is
WITH PREJUDICE; and
Motion for
DISMISSED
2. Defendant has thirty (30) days from the
date of this order to file a notice of appeal,
should he so choose.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at
Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida this
31st day of October, 2007.
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"High Court to Look at Life Sentences for Juveniles"
Washington Post
May 5, 2009
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court announced yesterday
that it will decide whether a 13-year-old
convicted of rape must spend the rest of his
life in prison, a new front in the court's
examination of whether sentences suitable
for adults may be applied to teenagers.
The justices took two cases from Florida,
one involving the 13-year-old and another
involving a 17-year-old convicted in a home
invasion, to decide whether the penalty of
life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole violates the Constitution's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishments.
The court's first public appearance since
Justice David H. Souter announced his
upcoming retirement produced several
decisions and the announcement about cases
it has accepted for the term beginning in the
fall. But, as is the court's way, there was no
acknowledgment of Souter's news, and he
sat quietly while other justices announced
the decisions.
Among the opinions was the court's
unanimous ruling trimming prosecutors'
ability to use a federal law on "aggravated
identity theft" as leverage in cases against
illegal immigrants. The court said the
government must prove that the worker
using a phony identification number knew
that it belonged to someone else.
The most dramatic of the sentencing cases
involves Joe Sullivan, now 33, who was
convicted of rape two decades ago after a
burglary at the home of a 72-year-old
woman in Pensacola, Fla. The woman did
not see Sullivan but identified his voice, and
he was implicated by other, older boys who
were part of the burglary.
Sullivan is being represented by Bryan A.
Stevenson of the Equal Justice Initiative,
which is challenging life sentences for
juveniles in cases across the country in
which the victim was not killed. Last week,
a California appeals court struck down a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole
for a 14-year-old convicted of aggravated
kidnapping.
Stevenson said Sullivan's case is extreme
and "freakishly rare."
"Nationwide, Joe Sullivan is one of only two
thirteen-year-old children who received life-
without-parole sentences for crimes in
which the victims did not die," his brief said.
"Both of these sentences were imposed in
Florida, making Florida the only state to
have sentenced a thirteen-year-old to die in
prison for a non-homicide."
Only a handful of countries allow life
sentences without parole for juveniles.
The cases present a logical question for the
court, which in 2005 decided that those
younger than 18 are not eligible for the
death penalty. During its last term, in a case
involving a man who had raped a child, the
court decided that capital punishment was
not warranted for crimes in which the victim
is not killed.
Attorneys for then-17-year-old Terrance
Graham, sentenced to life imprisonment for
a series of home invasions, said the court
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should review the policy because "virtually
the entire international community has
condemned this nation's practice."
The cases, which will be argued separately,
are Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v.
Florida.
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"Why Two Juvenile Sentence Cases?"
SCOTUSBlog
May 4, 2009
Lyle Denniston
With a continuing wave across the country
of tougher punishment for youths who
commit serious crimes, the Supreme Court
on Monday returned to the constitutional
controversy that the wave has stirred. The
Court took on two new juvenile sentencing
cases that, seemingly, raise the same issue,
but apparently left itself the option of
treating them differently. It did not explain,
but a few reasons may be suggested.
In a way, it might be said that the Court has
been waiting for a case to reach it clearly
presenting this issue: is it unconstitutional,
under the Eighth Amendment's ban on
"cruel and unusual punishment," to impose a
life prison sentence with no chance of early
release on a teenager under age 18? Both
new cases-Graham v. Florida (08-7412)
and Sullivan v. Florida (08-7621)-raise
that issue.
Advocates for youth have been arguing that
such a sentence in effect amounts to a death-
in-prison sentence, and thus should be
judged by the same tough constitutional
standard as a sentence directly imposing
death. They thus have been seeking a chance
to follow up on the Supreme Court's 2005
decision in Roper v. Simmons, striking down
altogether the death penalty for minors, a
decision based partly on the theory that
youths are not as responsible for their
actions as adults.
The first post-Roper case to reach the Court
testing the Eighth Amendment as it applied
to long sentences for youths-Pittman v.
South Carolina (07-8436)-was turned
aside by the Justices last year. A 12-year-
old, Christopher Frank Pittman, had been
convicted of a double murder. He was given
a 30-year prison sentence, without
possibility of a parole. The Court turned
aside that case on April 14 of last Term,
apparently unready to examine a lengthy
sentence when the crime victim was slain.
The next logical test case, it appeared,
would be one in which a minor was given a
life prison sentence for a crime in which the
victim was not killed. The Court became
aware last October that a case on that issue
was on its way-the case of Joe Harris
Sullivan, who was given life without parole
in Florida after a conviction for sexual
battery, a crime committed when he was 13
years old. Before that case was actually
filed, however, the case of Terrance Jamar
Graham arrived; he was given life without
parole in Florida after violating his
probation after an earlier guilty plea for
armed burglary; he was 17 at the time of the
life sentence.
Eventually, the Court considered the two
cases together, examined them several times
then granted them-separately-on
Monday. It is quite common for the Court,
when it has two or more cases raising the
same issue, to pick only one for review, or
to consolidate them for a joint ruling. It took
neither option this time, setting the stage for
two rulings, perhaps with different potential
outcomes.
Sullivan's case, as his lawyers fashioned it,
is directly very specifically at life without
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parole for youths who are only 13 years old
(or younger). Their petition contends that
these younger children are more fully
shielded by the Eighth Amendment than
older teenagers-such as, presumably, a 17-
year-old like Graham.
But the Sullivan petition raises a separate
issue: is he entitled to a ruling on his Eighth
Amendment challenge years after his
conviction-he was sentenced nearly 20
years ago, and now is unable or very
unlikely to be able to get any lower court to
review his claim, yet, his lawyers say, the
Court's more recent Eighth Amendment
rulings suggest that he should be able to test
his sentence even now.
The Court will hear both issues, and thus
there is at least a chance that Sullivan might
not be allowed to raise his constitutional
argument, because it could be found to have
come too late.
The Graham case only involves the specific
issue of an Eighth Amendment violation in a
life without parole sentence for a minor.
Thus, the Court may have wanted a second
case before it in case it should find that
Sullivan did not present that claim properly.
Another difference between the two, of
course, is the youths' relative age. The
Court, if it reached the life sentence issue in
Sullivan, might be more sympathetic to a
youth of his age getting a life term for a
sexual crime that left the victim injured, but
not dead. The Court last Term ruled out a
death sentence for such a crime (in Kennedy
v. Louisiana, involving a child victim who
was not killed).
Graham, by contrast, is four years older, and
was given a life prison term after returning
to criminal activity after being spared a long
prison term for an earlier episode. Some
members of the Court may have found him a
less sympathetic figure, and wanted to have
that case on the docket to perhaps limit the
scope of any ruling that went against life
terms for teenagers.
Indeed, it might be speculated that the Court
spent most of a month looking at these two
cases as it tried to sort out just what it
wanted before it, and the grant of both cases
might well have been a compromise
between the Court's two ideological wings.
The Court has been split deeply in its most
recent rulings limiting the scope of the death
penalty, and there is no reason to anticipate
a more unified bench on this new
controversy involving life without parole-a
severe sentence for a minor.
The Court will hold oral argument on the
two cases in the Term starting Oct. 5, very
likely in tandem hearings on the same day.
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"Sentenced as Teen, Convicted Rapist Appeals to Highest Court"
CNN. com
April 20, 2009
Bill Mears
At 33, Joe Sullivan is serving a life term
without the possibility of parole in a Florida
prison while confined to a wheelchair.
The crime for which he was convicted was
brutal: burglary and the rape of a 72-year-
old woman in Pensacola.
The man's lawyers say the punishment was
equally harsh, particularly for someone with
Sullivan's circumstances. He was 13 at the
time, and is one of only two people his age
in the world, say his supporters, tried as an
adult and sentenced to "die in prison" for a
crime that wasn't a homicide.
Now the Supreme Court is being asked to
decide whether that sentence was cruel and
unusual punishment for someone who was
barely a teenager at the time of his crime.
The justices are scheduled to announce
Monday whether they will accept the case
for review. If they do, oral arguments would
be held in the fall. If the review is rejected,
Sullivan would have few legal options
remaining to reduce his sentence. His
lawyers are also fighting to get him a new
trial.
Outside a death-penalty context, the high
court has offered little recent guidance on
how to treat the youngest of underage
criminal defendants. The appellate record
for rapists under age 15 is almost
nonexistent, say legal experts consulted by
CNN.
Child legal advocates say many states lack
adequate resources to handle young inmates
given long sentences, including a lack of
proper jailhouse counseling. Few studies
have been conducted on the psychological
effects on young defendants facing life in
prison, said the Equal Justice Institute,
which is representing Sullivan in the high
court case.
"We have created a forgotten population
with a lot of needs," said Bryan Stevenson,
Sullivan's lawyer.
The crime happened in 1989, when Sullivan
later admitted he and two friends ransacked
a home in West Pensacola. But he denied
the prosecutor's claim he returned with a
knife and sexually assaulted the elderly
homeowner. An older co-defendant claimed
Sullivan was the rapist.
According to the trial record, the victim
testified the assailant was a youngster with
"kinky hair and he was quite black and he
was small." She could not recognize
Sullivan by his facial features, but the
defendant was made to repeat at trial what
he allegedly told the woman: "If you can't
identify me, I may not have to kill you."
The victim testified, "It's been six months,
it's hard, but it does sound similar."
After a daylong trial, Escambia County
circuit court Judge Nicholas Geeker
sentenced Sullivan to life without parole.
"I am going to try to send him away for as
long as I can, he is beyond help," the judge
told the boy. "The juvenile system has been
utterly incapable of doing anything with Mr.
Sullivan."
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Sullivan had a lengthy juvenile record, but
continues to deny the attack.
At the time, state prosecutor Larry Kaden,
who retired last month, said, "It was a brutal
crime and he had an extensive record. This
was a bad, bad crime." The Florida Attorney
General's office told the high court that
prosecutors should have the discretion they
have long been given to decide how harshly
young criminal should be prosecuted. Sexual
battery remains a crime punishable by life
imprisonment in Florida.
A study by the Equal Justice Institute found
eight prisoners serving life terms for crimes
committed at 13, all in the United States.
Besides Sullivan, Florida inmate Ian Manuel
is in a similar situation. He was 13 when
convicted of attempted murder and robbery
in 1990 and will not get out of prison.
The Justice Department reports no 13-year-
old has been given life without parole for
crime that wasn't a homicide in a decade.
And while about a thousand people every
year under 15 are arrested for rape, none
have been given life without parole since
Sullivan.
Only a handful of states-including Alaska,
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico and
Oregon-prohibit sentencing minors to life
without a chance for parole, according to the
National Conference of State Legislatures.
Equal Justice Institute says 19 states have
laws allowing the possibility of life without
parole for those under age 14.
The high court in April 2008 refused to hear
the case of a South Carolina boy who was
12 when he murdered his grandparents and
was given a 30-year sentence, the maximum
allowed under state law. Tried as an adult,
Christopher Pittman's lawyers had argued
the sentence was excessive. and that heavy
doses of antidepressants the boy was taking
at the time sent his mind spinning out off
control.
While disappointed, Pittman's attorney
Michelle Deitch speculated the justices may
"have recognized the growing national trend
against sentencing young children to harsh
mandatory terms in prison, and wants to
give state legislatures the opportunity to
correct this problem before it rules again on
the issue."
Sullivan's attorneys hope the high court is
ready to revisit the issue. The Supreme
Court in 2005 banned the death penalty for
underage killers. The justices in that case
cited evolving "national standards" as a
reason to ban such executions.
"When a juvenile commits a heinous crime,
the state can exact a forfeiture of some of
the most basic liberties," wrote Justice
Anthony Kennedy at the time. "But the state
cannot extinguish his life and his potential to
attain a mature understanding of his own
humanity."
Sullivan is in deteriorating health from
multiple sclerosis and confined to -close
management" for dangerous or trouble-
prone inmates, say state corrections
officials. His lawyers admit he has had more
than a 100 incidents of fighting and
threatening inmates and guards, and having
contraband and weapons, but say Sullivan is
the victim of bullying by other prisoners and
is mentally disabled.
"It's important for the criminal justice
system to recognize that inmates like Joe
[Sullivan] are going to change, biologically,
psychologically and emotionally as they
grow up in prison," said Stevenson. "We
should not assume it is a change for the
worse."
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Sullivan's appellate team places much of the
blame on his original trial attorney, who
presented no opening statement and only
brief closing remarks. No DNA results were
offered and the state destroyed the biological
evidence in 1993. "It was absolutely
outrageous," said Stevenson. The trial
lawyer was later suspended from practicing
law.
The thrust of their argument before the high
court is not that Sullivan is innocent, nor
that he seeks his freedom now, just that he
deserves to someday make his case before
the state parole board.
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"Judge Gives Teen-Ager Life Term in Rape Case"
The Miami Herald
December 14, 1989
From The Associated Press
A 14-year-old boy has received a life term
without parole, a tougher sentence than
some adult muderers get, for twice raping an
elderly woman when he was 13.
Under a quirk in state law, Joe Harris
Sullivan, who was sentenced Tuesday,
would have been eligible for parole after 25
years if he had killed his victim and received
life for first-degree murder, Assistant State
Attorney Larry Kaden said Wednesday.
Florida law doesn't provide for paroling
criminals given life terms under sentencing
guidelines that do not apply to capital cases,
Kaden said. Sullivan's past criminal record
and other crimes committed in connection
with the rapes gave him a guideline score
that called for life, Kaden said.
"I'm going to try to send him away for as
long as I can," Circuit Judge Nicholas
Geeker said before imposing two concurrent
life sentences on the Pensacola youngster.
Regardless of the boy's age, he deserved the
maximum sentence because of his long
criminal history, including an assault on a
mental health clinic counselor and a
burglary during which he killed a dog,
Kaden told the judge. Geeker agreed.
"He is beyond help,- the judge said. "The
juvenile system has been utterly incapable of
doing anything with Mr. Sullivan."
Kaden said he expected the case to be
appealed. Sullivan's attorney, Mack Plant,
said Wednesday that he doesn-t handle
appellate work but that the court would
appoint an attorney for the youth if he
wanted to appeal.
A jury convicted Sullivan as an adult of
burglary, theft and sexual battery after about
30 minutes of deliberation Nov. 30.
He had been accused of breaking into the
72-year-old woman's Pensacola area home
when she away last May 4, stealing jewelry
and cash, and returning later the same day to
rape her twice at knifepoint.
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"Police Arrest 3 Robbery Suspects"
The Florida Times-Union
December 4, 2004
Tia Mitchell
Jacksonville police have arrested three men
accused of robbing two Hispanic day
laborers Thursday.
One of the three was shot during what police
said was another robbery attempt.
Two Latino men were inside an apartment
on Barnhill Drive when they heard a knock
on the door about 8:30 p.m., according to a
police report. When they opened the door,
several men with pistols stormed inside and
began ransacking the home, they told police.
After stealing a gold chain and $57, the
robbers left, the report said. No one inside
the apartment was injured.
About a half-hour later. a man who was in
his apartment on Art Museum Drive said he
armed himself after he heard a knock at the
door but didn't see anyone through the
peephole.
Words were eventually exchanged between
the man inside the apartment and someone
outside and the person was shot. Police
redacted from a report details about the
events leading up to the shooting. A vehicle
was seen speeding away from the apartment
building.
Minutes later. Meigo Alphonso Bailey was
dropped off at Memorial Hospital
Jacksonville. Bailey's injuries were initially
believed to be life-threatening and he was
transferred to Shands Jacksonville.
Meanwhile, the two men who dropped him
off, Terrance J. Graham and Kirkland G.
Lawrence. were taken into custody after
their vehicle was involved in an accident.
Police say they found the gold chain that had
been reported stolen.
Lawrence, 20, of the 900 block of Bert Road,
and Graham, 17, of the 700 block of
Moseley Street, were charged with home-
invasion robbery and were being held
without bail at the Duval County jail.
Bailey was also charged with home-invasion
robbery. He was in fair condition Friday at
Shands Jacksonville.
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"Defining 'Cruel and Unusual' When Offender Is 13"
The New York Times
February 3, 2009
Adam Liptak
In 1989, someone raped a 72-year-old
woman in Pensacola, Fla. Joe Sullivan was
13 at the time, and he admitted that he and
two older friends had burglarized the
woman's home earlier that day. But he
denied that he had returned to commit the
rape.
The victim testified that her assailant was -a
colored boy" who "had kinky hair and he
was quite black and he was small." She said
she "did not see him full in the face" and so
would not recognize him by sight. But she
recalled her attacker saying something like,
"If you can't identify me, I may not have to
kill you."
At his trial, Mr. Sullivan was made to say
those words several times.
"It's been six months," the woman said on
the witness stand. "It's hard, but it does
sound similar."
The trial lasted a day and ended in
conviction. Then Judge Nicholas Geeker, of
the circuit court in Escambia County,
sentenced Mr. Sullivan to life without the
possibility of parole.
"I'm going to send him away for as long as I
can," Judge Geeker said.
Mr. Sullivan is 33 now, and his lawyers
have asked the United States Supreme Court
to consider the question of whether the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment extends to sentencing
someone who was barely a teenager to die in
prison for a crime that did not involve a
killing.
People can argue about whether the
punishment in Mr. Sullivan's case is cruel.
There is no question that it is unusual.
According to court papers and a report from
the Equal Justice Initiative, which now
represents Mr. Sullivan, only eight people in
the world are serving sentences of life
without parole for crimes they committed
when they were 13. All are in the United
States.
And there are only two people in that group
whose crimes did not involve a killing. Both
are in Florida, and both are black.
Joe Sullivan is one; Ian Manuel, who is in
prison for a 1990 robbery and attempted
murder, is the other.
About 1,000 people under 15 are arrested on
rape charges every year, according to Justice
Department data. But none of them have
been sentenced to life without parole since
Mr. Sullivan was. Indeed, no 13-year-old
has been sentenced to life without parole for
any crime that did not involve a killing in
more than 15 years.
Florida's attorney general, Bill McCollum,
waived his right to file a response to Mr.
Sullivan's petition to the Supreme Court, a
sign suggesting that he considers the case
insubstantial if not frivolous. Sandi Copes, a
spokeswoman for Mr. McCollum's office,
declined to discuss the case.
Last month, the court indicated that it found
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the case more interesting than Florida does,
requesting a response from the state. That
probably means that at least one justice
considered the case significant or difficult.
But it is nothing like a guarantee that the
court will agree to hear it.
On the other hand, the question of whether
life without parole for juveniles is
constitutional is the logical next step
following the court's 2005 decision in Roper
v. Simmons, which struck down the death
penalty for crimes committed by 16- and 17-
year-olds. Writing for the majority in that
case, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said that
even older teenagers are different from
adults. They are less mature, more
impulsive, more susceptible to peer pressure
and more likely to change for the better over
time.
Last year, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the court
issued another ruling that helps frame Mr.
Sullivan's case. That decision said crimes
against individuals that did not involve
killing, including the rape of a child by an
adult, may not be punished by death.
In 2007, after Mr. Sullivan had served
almost two decades in prison, a Florida
appeals court declined to have another look
at his case. The Roper decision, the appeals
court said, "established only one new
constitutional right, the right for a juvenile
not to be given the death penalty."
Douglas A. Berman, an authority on
sentencing law at Ohio State, said it was
time for the Supreme Court and the legal
system to widen its relentless focus on
capital cases and to look at other severe
sentences as well. Cases involving the death
penalty receive careful review at multiple
levels, he said. Life sentences can receive
almost none.
Mr. Sullivan's trial, for instance, lasted a
day. He was represented by a lawyer who
made no opening statement and whose
closing argument occupies about three
double-spaced pages of the trial transcript.
The lawyer was later suspended, and the
Florida Bar's Web site says he is "not
eligible to practice in Florida."
There was biological evidence from the
rape, but it was not presented at the trial.
When Mr. Sullivan's new lawyers recently
sought to conduct DNA testing on it, they
were told that the state had destroyed it in
1993.
"I absolutely believe he is innocent," Bryan
A. Stevenson, the executive director of the
Equal Justice Initiative, said of Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Stevenson said he believed that one of
the older youths who committed the
burglary with Mr. Sullivan and who testified
against him was probably the actual
assailant.
But the point made by Mr. Sullivan's brief
to the Supreme Court is not that he is
innocent. It is not even that he should be
released after 20 years in prison. It is only
that he should someday be allowed to make
his case to the Florida Parole Commission.
"I don't think it's possible to say that a 13-
year-old will never change and that life
without parole is an appropriate
punishment," Mr. Stevenson said.
Aside from Mr. Sullivan's case, it seems
there is only one other appeals court
decision about whether young teenagers
may be locked away forever for rape. It was
issued 40 years ago in Kentucky, and it
involved two 14-year-olds. The court struck
down the part of the sentences precluding
the possibility of parole.
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Juveniles "arc not permitted to vote, to
contract, to purchase alcoholic beverages or
to marry without the consent of their
parents," the court said. -It seems
inconsistent that one be denied the fruits of
the tree of the law, yet subjected to all of its
thorns."
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"States Reconsider Life Behind Bars for Youth"
The Christian Science Monitor
March 12, 2008
Amanda Paulson
How should a society treat its youngest
criminal offenders? And the families of
victims of those offenders?
Half a dozen states are now weighing these
questions anew, as they consider whether to
ban life sentences for juveniles that don't
include an option for parole-and whether
those now serving such sentences should
have a retroactive shot at parole.
Here in Illinois, proposed legislation would
give 103 people-most convicted of
unusually brutal crimes-a chance at parole
hearings, while outlawing the sentence for
future young perpetrators.
The proposal has victims' families up in
arms, angry that killers they had been told
were in prison for life might be given a shot
at release and that they'd need to regularly
attend hearings in the future, reliving old
traumas, to try to ensure that these criminals
remain behind bars.
Advocates of legislation, meanwhile, both in
Illinois and elsewhere, note that the US is
the only country in the world with anyone-
nearly 2,400 across the nation-serving such
a severe sentence for a crime committed as a
juvenile. They criticize the fact that the
sentence is often mandatory, part of a
system devoid of leniency for a teenager's
lack of judgment, or hope that youth can be
reformed.
"Kids should be punished, and held
accountable. The crimes we're talking about
are very serious crimes," says Alison Parker,
deputy director of the US program of
Human Rights Watch and author of a report
on the issue. -But children are uniquely able
to rehabilitate themselves, to grow up and to
change. A life-without-parole sentence says
they're beyond repair, beyond hope."
The sentence is automatic for certain crimes
in more than half of all states, part of a wave
of "get tough" laws aimed at cracking down
on rising crime rates during the 1980s and
'90s. Which means judges often have little
to no discretion when they mete out
punishment. In many instances, they are
prohibited from considering age or even
whether the juvenile was the one who pulled
the trigger. About a quarter of the juveniles
serving life without parole sentences
nationally were convicted of what is known
as "felony murder," says Ms. Parker. They
participated in a felony in which murder was
committed, but they weren't the ones who
did the actual killing.
In Illinois, that list includes Marshan Allen,
a 15-year-old who accompanied an older
brother and some friends on a drug-related
mission, and says he didn't know they were
going to kill several people.
In California, another state considering
doing away with the sentence, it includes
Anthony, a 16-year-old painting graffiti with
a friend when the friend produced a gun and
decided to rob an approaching group of
teenagers. His friend pulled the trigger, but
Anthony-who turned down a plea bargain
because he couldn't imagine paying for a
crime he didn't feel he'd committed-got a
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life-without-parole sentence.
"'There are people in prison for crimes they
committed as juveniles that should never see
the light of day," says Rich Klawiter, a
partner at the law firm DLA Piper and part
of the Illinois Coalition for the Fair
Sentencing of Children, which produced a
report on the issue last month and advocates
reform. "But those that show themselves
worthy of redemption ought to be given an
opportunity before a parole board."
The frequent citing of cases like Allen's
bothers supporters of the sentence, \who say
such examples are hardly representative.
Generally, the mandate is saved for such
extreme offenses as multiple murders,
killing of a police officer, aggravated sexual
assault, and murder of a child.
"These guys are the worst of the worst,"
says Jennifer Bishop-Jenkins, whose
pregnant sister and brother-in-law were
murdered by a 16-year-old in their
Winnetka, Ill., townhome in 1990. She
acknowledges automatic sentencing has
probably punished a few juveniles unfairly,
but notes that such individuals can always
appeal for clemency. What she doesn't
understand is bringing offenders back for
hearings that, in her mind, would only
unearth the past for the families of victims
who thought they'd seen their loved ones'
killers put away forever.
Ms. Bishop-Jenkins and her sister, Jeanne
Bishop, are both prominent victim activists
against the death penalty, and helped in the
case that got the juvenile death penalty
overturned by the Supreme Court three years
ago. Now, they both say, they feel betrayed
by the same allies with whom they fought
against the death penalty, who never sought
their input on this issue.
"Once you say this person could get out
someday through this mechanism, you've
just placed a crushing burden on the hearts
and minds of the victims' families," says
Jeanne Bishop, a Cook County public
defender who has also defended juveniles.
She and her sister both support getting rid of
the mandatory sentencing and giving judges
more discretion, but worry that in all the talk
of the human rights of juvenile offenders,
the rights of victims are being forgotten.
The current legislation in Illinois is unlikely
to go anywhere, with its key sponsor
backing away last week and saying more
time is needed to dialogue with victims.
Reform advocates hope to have new
legislation introduced in the near future.
Colorado outlawed juvenile life without
parole in 2006, and legislation is pending in
Michigan, Florida, Nebraska, and California,
while a few other states are experiencing
grass-roots efforts.
Some activists against the sentence say they
hope they can work with victims' families to
take their concerns into account even as they
do away with the sentence. In Michigan,
where a set of bills is before both the Senate
and the House, activists have had some
success building dialogue with victims, says
Deborah LaBelle, a human rights attorney
based in Ann Arbor and director of the
ACLU's Juvenile Life Without Parole
Initiative.
"We need to allow both voices to be heard,"
says Ms. LaBelle. But she feels strongly that
the sentence is inappropriate for youth. "As
every parent knows and as every social
scientist understands, this is a time of ill-
thought-out, impulsive lack of judgment,
problematic years.... To throw them away
and say you're irredeemable as a child is a
disturbing social concept."
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"Supreme Court Bans Execution of Juveniles"
Los Angeles Times
March 2, 2005
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court abolished the death
penalty for juveniles Tuesday, ruling that it
was excessive and cruel to execute a person
who was under 18 when the crime was
committed.
Juveniles are less mature than adults and, no
matter how heinous their crimes, they are
not among "the worst offenders" who
deserve to die, the 5-4 majority said.
Three years ago, the court struck down the
death penalty for mentally retarded
criminals; the logic of that ruling called for a
similar stance on juvenile offenders, the
court said.
Tuesday's decision means that 72 convicted
murderers on death rows in 12 states will be
resentenced. The ruling will also prohibit
execution of defendants in pending cases-
including Lee Boyd Malvo, one of the
snipers who terrorized Washington and its
Maryland and Virginia suburbs in 2002.
Because he was 17 when the crimes
occurred, Malvo was tried in Virginia-
which permitted the execution of juveniles.
But in his first trial, in Fairfax County, he
was sentenced to life in prison. Until
Tuesday, prosecutors hoping to win a death
sentence had planned to retry Malvo in
another Virginia county where one of the
shootings occurred.
The Constitution bars "cruel and unusual
punishments," and the majority opinion-
quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1958-
said this rule must be judged by "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."
By that standard, the practice of executing
young killers has become rare, outmoded
and unwarranted, the majority said.
In the U.S., only Texas, Oklahoma and
Virginia have executed juveniles in the last
decade.
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen,
Nigeria, Congo and China have executed
juvenile offenders since 1990, the court said,
but those nations since have disavowed the
practice.
"The stark reality is that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues
to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, an
appointee of President Reagan, wrote for the
majority.
"It is proper that we acknowledge the
overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty,"
he said. "While not controlling our outcome,
[it] does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions."
That comment drew a strong rebuke from
Justice Antonin Scalia-another Reagan
appointee-whose dissent accused the
majority of changing the Constitution to fit
its own shifting views of what was proper.
He said international opinion should play no
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role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
"The court proclaims itself the sole arbiter
of our nation's moral standards-and in the
course of discharging that awesome
responsibility purports to take guidance
from the views of foreign courts and
legislatures," Scalia said. "I do not believe
that the meaning of our [Constitution]
should be determined by the subjective
views of five members of this court and like-
minded foreigners."
Scalia said the court should have allowed
juries to continue to decide whether young
killers deserved to die.
Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer
joined Kennedy's opinion setting 18 as the
minimum age for capital punishment. They
noted that in nearly every state, 1 8 is the
minimum age for voting, serving on juries
and obtaining marriage licenses without
parental permission.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas joined Scalia's
dissent.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the court's
usual swing vote, dissented separately. She
said she agreed with Kennedy that the court
should look to "evolving standards of
decency," but she disagreed that there was a
"national consensus" against executing
young killers.
Since 1976, when the court upheld a new
generation of capital punishment laws, the
justices have been considering limits on
such sentences.
In 1977, the court abolished the death
penalty for crimes short of murder. Eleven
years later, it ruled that capital punishment
could not be imposed on anyone 15 or
younger-although in 1989 it upheld death
sentences for 16- and 17-vear-olds.
Human rights activists and death penalty
foes hailed the court's ruling Tuesday.
"This decision confirms what we all know
and what science recently has proven: Kids
are different," said Diann Rust-Tierney,
executive director of the National Coalition
to Abolish the Death Penalty. "Kids are
different from adults, and by their very
nature cannot qualify as the 'worst of the
worst' standard used by some to justify a
sentence of death."
Former President Carter and his wife,
Rosalynn, also praised the outcome. "With
this ruling, the United States . . . joins the
community of nations, which uniformly
renounces this practice," Carter said.
The National Conference of Catholic
Bishops said it was "very encouraged" that
the court was moving toward abolishing
capital punishment.
Death penalty advocates were strongly
critical of the ruling. The Law Enforcement
Alliance of America-a coalition of law
enforcement professionals-called the
decision "an abomination of justice."
Spokesman Kevin Watson said the decision
showed "the strong need to appoint the right
judges. There are some judges who want to
weaken our criminal justice system and
some who do not."
Kennedy rarely has been perceived as soft
on crime. In 1989, he cast the key vote to
uphold mandatory drug testing for certain
federal government jobs, and he once
delivered a 5-4 ruling that upheld a life
prison term for a Michigan man convicted of
his first drug offense.
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He also cast the key vote to uphold
California's "three strikes" law in a ruling
that sent a shoplifter to prison for life.
Like Scalia, Kennedy is a Roman Catholic
who says his faith strongly influences his
life. But unlike Scalia, he believes the court
must give a broad interpretation to the basic
freedoms and liberties in the Constitution.
Two years ago, he spoke for the court in
saying that gays and lesbians were entitled
to dignity and respect in their private lives.
His opinion struck down a Texas anti-
sodomy law that allowed the arrest and
prosecution of gay men for having sex at
home.
Kermedy says he strongly opposes abortion
personally and morally; but in 1992, he cast
a key vote to preserve the basic right of
women to choose abortion.
When the court took up the issue of the
death penalty for juveniles, it was clear the
outcome would depend on Kennedy and
O'Connor. The four most liberal justices
already had said they viewed the practice as
archaic and unconstitutional. The three
staunchest conservatives made clear their
view that states and juries should decide the
punishment for murder.
When Kennedy began reading his opinion
Tuesday, he described the murder
perpetrated by Christopher Simmons, then
17. In 1993, Simmons and two younger
accomplices broke into a neighbor's home,
intending to burglarize it. When the
neighbor, Shirley Crook, awoke and
recognized him, Simmons tied her up, put
duct tape over her eyes and mouth, put her
in a minivan and threw her off a railroad
bridge south of St. Louis. She drowned in
the waters below.
Simmons bragged about the crime, and soon
was arrested and charged with kidnapping
and capital murder. Prosecutors described
the crime as "wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman," and the jury sentenced Simmons
to die.
Two years ago, Missouri's highest court
overturned that sentence because of his age
at the time of the crime, forcing the Supreme
Court to revisit the issue in Roper v.
Simmons.
Kennedy concluded that even the
"coldblooded nature" of a crime like this did
not call for execution: "When a juvenile
offender commits a heinous crime, the state
can exact forfeiture of some of the basic
liberties, but [it] cannot extinguish his life."
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"U.S. Supreme Court vs. the World"
USA Today
June 19, 2005
Tony Mauro
The rumors sweep through Washington,
D.C.. like summer storms. One day, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist is about to resign.
The next day, not. The day after that, one or
more justices will join him in leaving the
bench. The truth is, no one can predict what
will happen.
Rehnquist, who is fighting thyroid cancer, is
keeping his plans to himself, if he has any.
He has shown remarkable stamina and
determination in keeping up with his work at
the court, and it would surprise no one if he
defied all the experts and stayed on for
months or longer.
So here is a safer prediction: When and if a
new justice is nominated, he or she will be
grilled about an issue you have probably not
heard much about: whether it is proper for
the Supreme Court to use international or
foreign law as a resource in deciding U.S.
cases.
Before your eyes glaze over or wander to a
nearby cartoon, let me add: This issue is a
big deal and has already played a significant
role in the court's decision-making in recent
years.
In landmark rulings upholding affirmative
action, supporting gay rights and, most
recently, striking down the death penalty for
juvenile offenders, justices have invoked the
practices of foreign nations and the rulings
of international courts to support their
conclusions. In the March 1 ruling Roper v.
Simmons, Justice Anthony Kennedy took
note of the "stark reality" that the United
States was the only nation in the world that
still sanctioned the execution of those who
were younger than 18 when they committed
their crimes.
That fact was far from the only reason
Kennedy and four other justices found such
executions unconstitutional. But to hear
conservatives' violent reaction to the
decision, you would think that it was the
only justification. and that Kennedy had
suddenly ceded the authority of the Supreme
Court to the laws of Klingon, or Mars.
The uproar
In a tone of incredulity, House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay said in April, "We've
got Justice Kennedy writing decisions based
upon international law-not the Constitution
of the United States." Congressional
Republicans have introduced a resolution to
disapprove of the practice. Justice Antonin
Scalia, the leading opponent of the trend,
said recently that the framers of the
Constitution "would be appalled" to see the
Supreme Court cite the laws of nations they
were trying to distance themselves from. As
the issue gains traction, the chances improve
that Scalia or Clarence Thomas, who also
opposes using foreign sources, will be
nominated as chief justice. Kennedy can kiss
his chances goodbye.
Why all the fuss over a seemingly technical
point of law? This debate is driven by
outcomes. In each of the recent cases in
which invoking foreign law has sparked
controversy, the decisions have been
progressive or liberal. But a lot of
international law is not so progressive. On
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issues ranging from freedom of speech to
abortion, much of the world is far to the
right of U.S. law. It will be interesting to see
whether conservatives get so upset when
cases come along in which international
doctrines would help their side.
But at a loftier plane, this is an important
debate about the court's role. Conservatives
who believe in a limited role for judges say
the Supreme Court should stick to its
knitting, namely interpreting the U.S.
Constitution as written, and should ignore
current fads here or abroad. But the counter-
argument is strong. If globalization has
flattened the world in terms of the economy
and culture, isn't it time that our legal system
also look beyond our borders? Are xe so
arrogant that we think we have nothing to
learn from judges and lawmakers around the
world who have faced the same issues we
face?
Kennedy's progression
I remember covering a meeting of the
American Bar Association in London in
2000 where Kennedy was asked by a British
barrister during a panel discussion why the
Supreme Court so rarely cites foreign court
rulings, when those courts so often cite ours.
Foreign rulings were too remote
unknown to American judges to
reliably, Kennedy replied-an answer
nearly got him hooted off the stage.
and
cite
that
Kennedy has come a long way since then,
and other justices have too. They all have
come to realize that the American legal
system is no longer viewed as the only
beacon of justice in the world. They do have
something to learn from the courts and laws
of other nations.
As is often the case, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has traveled a sensible middle
road on the issue. She recently said the
controversy was "much ado about nothing."
Sometimes it is appropriate to look to
foreign law, she said, and sometimes not-
but never should it be the deciding factor
when the job of the Supreme Court is to
interpret the U.S. Constitution.
But in today's world, ignoring it altogether
is not an option, she has said. In a speech
before the American Society of International
Law in 2002, O'Connor put it this way:
"Because of the scope of the problems that
we face, understanding international law is
no longer just a legal specialty. It is
becoming a duty."
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"The Young and the Reckless: The Supreme Court Contemplates
Executing Juveniles"
Slale
October 13, 2004
Dahlia Lithwick
The Supreme Court press gallery is
positioned directly across from the massive
Adolph Weinman frieze on the south wall of
the ceremonial courtroom-the one with
Moses, packed in amidst "great lawgivers of
history," Ten Commandments in hand.
Following yesterday's decision by the court
to hear a pair of Ten Commandments cases,
reporters around me are speculating about
what will happen to the poor Decalogue.
Someone suggests the Supremes should just
ditch the first four commandments as a
matter of federal constitutional law.
(Weinman's already done this by coyly
draping Moses' beard and robe anywhere on
the tablets "God" might appear.) Someone
opines that Mohammed and the Quran
probably need to come down as well. I'm
hoping one of the justices will knit a teeny
little commandment-cozy, to slip over the
statue.
Today's oral argument in Roper v'. Simmons
asks whether the execution of people who
were 16 or 17 years old when they
committed their crimes constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment. Obviously the Founders didn't
think executions of adolescents were cruel
and unusual, so we know where Scalia's
vote will go. But Scalia is cruelly pinned
beneath the ruling in Trop v. Dulles-a 1958
case holding that the Eighth Amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." Unlike much of the
court's jurisprudence, this analysis does not
require poring over texts or channeling
Thomas Jefferson. Instead, the court is asked
to blink directly into the bright light of
science and current events to determine
whether "evolving standards of decency"
mandate a change in the notion of what is
cruel and unusual. Among the justices who
believe the human race is evolving in what
is decidedly the wrong direction, this is pure
hell. Even contemplating the New Age
notion that a "teenage brain" exists must be
cruel and unusual punishment for Clarence
Thomas. But this is the test. So, away they
go.
Christopher Simmons was 17 when, in 1993,
he robbed and abducted Shirley Crook. He
tied and gagged her with electrical wire and
duct tape and threw her off a railroad bridge
from which she plummeted and drowned.
Simmons evidently bragged to friends that
he'd get away with this since he was a minor.
The jury disagreed, convicting him of first-
degree murder and sentencing him to death.
The last time the Supreme Court heard a
case about the constitutionality of executing
16- and 17-year-olds was in 1989-when it
decided Stanford v. Kentucky. A plurality of
the court determined then that there was no
social or historical consensus that the death
penalty was cruel and unusual for teens of
those ages, even though in 1988 the court
had determined that such a consensus
existed for offenders under 15. In 2002 the
court voted 6-3 to ban the execution of the
mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia, using
the "evolving standards" test to find that
most states no longer believed it acceptable
to execute them and that the mentally
retarded had diminished culpability for their
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crimes.
The Atkins decision somehow emboldened
the Missouri Supreme Court-which was
deciding Simmons' case-to just overrule
the Supremes' original Stanford decision
completely. Leaning on the reasoning in
Atkins, the Missouri court decided that a
new consensus walks among us and that the
Supreme Court had missed the boat. Nine
out of 10 dentists agree: It's bad to kill
teenagers.
James Layton, the state solicitor of Missouri,
is here this morning to remind the high court
that it's been dissed. He argues that the
proper age to be executed should be left in
the hands of legislatures and that the issue of
an individual's culpability and maturity are
best left to a jury. "Some 17-year-olds are
culpable," he says, "and some are not."
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggests that
society treats those under 18 as not-adult in
dozens of ways-they are unable to vote,
serve on juries or in the military, or buy
tobacco. "Why would you be death-eligible
at 18 but not eligible to be a member of the
community?
Justice Antonin Scalia heads the other way:
"Why stop at the death penalty?" he asks.
"Why not say anyone under 18 is immune
from all punishment?" (He doesn't really
mean this. This is just his way.)
Everyone's eyes are on Sandra Day
O'Connor again today. Hers was the swing
vote in Thompson v. Oklahoma-the case
banning executions for 15-year-olds. Her
concurrence was also the key to Stanford v.
Kentucky-the case allowing executions for
16-year-olds. We know four justices already
oppose killing minors because in 2002, John
Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer all dissented
when the Supremes refused to hear a case on
this issue. They did not mince words: "The
practice of executing such offenders is a
relic of the past and is inconsistent with
evolving standards of decency in a civilized
society. We should put an end to this
shameful practice."
So, they need one more vote. But O'Connor
says virtually nothing today. She asks a
single question of Layton: "Isn't there about
the same consensus that existed in Atkins
[the case about the mentally retarded]?
Aren't we obliged to look at that?" That's all
she says, folks. Read your tea leaves here.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the other swing
vote in Atkins, asks whether the fact of
adolescence can ever be used to increase
penalties. Layton says it's only used as a
mitigating factor. So, Ginsburg reads at
length from the transcript of Simmons'
sentencing, in which the prosecutor
threatened the jurors with: "Think about it.
He's only 17 years old. Isn't that scary?
Mitigating? Quite the contrary!" Ginsburg
suggests his youth was used to demonize
Simmons.
Kennedy then turns to the real nut of the
problem: "Let's focus on the word
'unusual.' Forget 'cruel.' There is
substantial demonstration that the world is
against us, at least among the leaders of the
European Union. Does that have a bearing
on whether this is unusual?"
The "substantial demonstration" to which he
refers includes amicus briefs from 48
foreign countries, assorted Nobel Peace
Prize winners, and some high-octane
religious, medical, and human rights groups,
all reminding the court that no other
civilized country permits juvenile executions
and that our policy violates the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child. A
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convention only the United States refuses to
ratify.
Layton says decisions on the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment should not be based on
foreign opinion.
Breyer asks, "Do you have any indication of
whether Madison or Jefferson would have
thought it was totally irrelevant what
happened elsewhere in the world?" Layton
says Jefferson believed the United States
was leading the world but doing so through
legislation, not the courts.
Scalia adds, "And what did John Adams
think of the French?" Layton replies that he
didn't think very highly of them. A reminder
that blaming all of life's ills on the French
predates Fox News.
Breyer notes that if you look at the past 10
years, only three states have executed
juveniles. Texas killed 11, Virginia killed
three, and Oklahoma killed two. If even the
states that allow it don't do it, isn't that a
consensus?
Seth Waxman represents Christopher
Simmons, and he starts the morning looking
like a guy who only needs one vote. When
he says that since Stanford a consensus has
emerged, it becomes clear that Scalia won't
be that one vote: "Does the constitutional
calculus ever move in the other direction?"
Scalia asks, meaning, is there ever a
consensus toward killing more rather than
fewer people?
Waxman soon makes an odd word choice,
saying the "world consensus" represents
"the better view in Europe." Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, previewing the part
of George W. Bush tonight, shoots back,
"What suggests it's a 'better view in
Europe7'?"
Waxman points out that the vast scientific
evidence amassed in this case to suggest that
teenage brains are still undeveloped didn't
exist in 1989 \hen the court decided
Stanford. So, the chief jLlstice asks whether
all this psychological evidence was
introduced at trial. *1 would think if you
want us to rely on it, it should be introduced
at trial. Not just in an amicus brief."
Waxman is a bit stuck. For one thing, some
of this research came about after Simmons'
1997 trial. For another, as he points out, the
question of whether executing juveniles is
constitutional wasn't an issue at trial. It was
state law and what the jury was told to work
with. The chief justice is unimpressed. And
Kennedy, who seems to be searching for a
reason to vote for killing teens, agrees all
this psychological evidence should have
been introduced at trial. Waxman tries to say
these are legislative, constitutional facts,
having nothing to do with Simmons' murder
charges. So, Kennedy flat-out tells him,
"Suppose I am not persuaded by this
argument. Do you lose the case?"
These are never felicitous words to a man
looking for just one vote.
Waxman says teenagers are like the
mentally retarded in that they cannot
properly communicate with counsel or
express remorse and because their characters
will change so much. On trial, years later,
jurors see a different person.
Scalia says: "I thought we punish people for
what they were, not are. To say after the
crime that he's come to Jesus . . . we don't
let them off. You're never the same person
that committed the crime."
Kennedy finally hits on his reason to vote
against the punk kids: "A number of
juveniles run in gangs," he says. "Some
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gang members are over 18. If we rule in
your favor. wouldn't that make 16-, 17-year-
olds subject to being hit men in gangs? I'm
very worried about that."
Kinder to execute them instead.
Kennedy cites the "chilling" amicus brief
filed by the state of Alabama. "I wish all the
other amicus that had signed on had read it,"
he frets. Stupid Dalai Lama. The Alabama
brief is hideous indeed-a detailed catalog
of the junior Jeffrey Dahmers who have
terrorized the state of Alabama. The
truism-that kids who kill folks are really,
really terrible-is not lost on Kennedy.
Layton's rebuttal is impressive. Suddenly he
can see himself pulling this case out. He
uses Lee Boyd Malvo-spared the death
penalty by a Virginia jury-as an example
of how the current system works. Jurors can
tell whether someone is immature or
culpable.
Dissenting in Atkins, Justice Antonin Scalia
once raged: "But the Prize for the Court's
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national
consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly
relegated to a footnote) to the views of
assorted professional and religious
organizations, members of the so-called
'world community' . . . the views of
professional and religious organizations and
the results of opinion polls are irrelevant.
Equally irrelevant are the practices of the
' world community,' whose notions of justice
are (thankfully) not always those of our
people."
This is an argument George Bush makes
fivc times every debate. (Watch for it again
tonight.) While we might agree that world
opinion, international law, and scientific
truth can't single-handedly dictate American
law or policy, the new patriotism holds that
they cannot even illuminate it.
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